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Political Economy, Poverty, and Polycentrism in the Global Environment Facility’s Least 
Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) for Climate Change Adaptation  
1. Introduction  
Climate change adaptation refers to altering infrastructure, institutions, or ecosystems to 
respond to the impacts of climate change.  Notwithstanding the great promise it offers society, 
something might be going softly, silently awry with projects. A survey of hundreds of studies of 
climate change adaptations implemented over the previous decade reached a worrying 
conclusion: many projects were not helping the most vulnerable, and were instead strengthening 
established sectors that had already received large shares of adaptation funding.1 Another article 
warned that within adaptation projects, “Deeply entrenched social institutions and norms may 
influence which group members will be able to have a voice and ultimately exercise rights.”2 
Similarly, Biermann et al. demonstrated how adaptation interventions are geared to serve 
particular interests, be it donor agencies or the agendas of particular companies.3 Adger 
hypothesized that “vulnerability to environmental change does not exist in isolation from the 
wider political economy of resource use” and that “vulnerability is driven by inadvertent or 
deliberate human action that reinforces self-interest and the distribution of power in addition to 
interacting with physical and ecological systems.”4 Watts and Bohle et al. further elaborate that 
vulnerability is a “multi-layered and multi-dimensional social space defined by determinate 
political, economic and institutional capabilities of people in specific place at specific times.”5 
To explore these themes in a more systematic way, this article documents the presence of 
four inequitable attributes of adaptation projects—processes we have termed enclosure, 
exclusion, encroachment, and entrenchment—cutting across economic, political, ecological, and 
social dimensions. We find the four processes at work simultaneously in our case studies of five 
projects being implemented as part of the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), the largest 
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pool of adaptation projects for poor countries.  The article concludes with a discussion of the 
broader implications of the political economy of adaptation for analysts, program managers, and 
climate researchers at large. In sum, the politics of adaptation must be taken into account so that 
projects can maximize their efficacy and avoid marginalizing those most vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change. 
In proceeding on this path, we aim to make three contributions.  First, the study focuses 
on the politics of adaptation in practice.  It moves beyond vulnerability mapping to assess the 
effects of current adaptation efforts.  Much policy research related to adaptation centers on 
providing credible estimates of adaptation costs, or conducting vulnerability assessments, or 
trying to guide future adaptation strategies at the sectoral or national level.  Instead, this article 
investigates the effects of adaptation efforts.  Such an assessment is essential if policymakers and 
scholars are to prioritize the policies and measures that work best at accomplishing adaptation 
goals.  The article thus contributes to the emerging work on monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of 
adaptation, and it also underscores some of the social, political, and economic factors (negative 
or positive) that can influence projects.    
Second, the study’s focus on poverty and least developed countries is unique.  The LDCF 
is special because, as the name implies, it is dedicated to the countries belonging to the group of 
“least developed,”6 meaning they have low incomes (less than about $900 per capita per year), 
weak human assets, and high economic and social vulnerability.  Least developed countries 
therefore lack the requisite capacity to implement adaptation projects.   
Third, the study analyzes a form of polycentric climate governance—a term that refers to 
when a given policy or intervention blends together actors from different scales of 
implementation.7 8  The LDCF meets this classification as it is a multilateral fund involving 
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many different actors of varying types across a range of scales.  The LDCF program itself is 
managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), an entity operating the financial mechanism 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  It thus represents 
a shift from the “classic” form of governance involving nation states to a newly emerging hybrid 
model coupling public and private partnerships with decentralized and cost-sharing forms of 
implementation. 9 This form of governance involves the range of climate governance 
topographies with global, national, and local scalar interactions and public, private, civil society 
actors. The wide array of actors involved in this process, as this paper will illustrate, presents a 
huge challenge in terms of coordination, efficacy and governance of these projects.   
2. Literature Review and Case Selection  
This section briefly introduces readers to adaptation before summarizing some main 
themes in the literature.  “Adaptation” was defined in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change’s (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report as “adjustment in natural or human systems in 
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits 
beneficial opportunities.”10 Adaptation is often contrasted with mitigation, which the report 
defines as “an anthropogenic intervention to reduce the anthropogenic forcing of the climate 
system; it includes strategies to reduce greenhouse gas sources and emissions and enhance 
greenhouse gas sinks.”11 Put in very simple terms, mitigation is avoiding climate change, 
whereas adaptation is coping with climate change, or as Brown and Sovacool (2011) put it, 
mitigation is “avoiding the unmanageable” whereas adaptation is “managing the unavoidable.”12 
That is the simple version. In practice, adaptation can be understood in a variety of ways. Table 1 
introduces a number of related, though differing, definitions of adaptation. 
Table 1: Eight Definitions of Climate Change “Adaptation” 
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Definition Year Source 
“The process through which people reduce the adverse 
effects of climate on their health and wellbeing, and 
take advantage of the opportunities that their climatic 
environment provides” 
1992 Canadian Climate Center13 
“Adjustments to enhance the viability of social and 
economic activities and to reduce their vulnerability to 
climate, including its current variability and extreme 
events as well as longer term climate change” 
1993 University of Guelph14 
“Any adjustment, whether passive, reactive or 
anticipatory, that is proposed as a means for 
ameliorating the anticipated adverse consequences 
associated with climate change” 
1993 U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers15 
“The degree to which adjustments are possible in 
practices, policies, or structures of systems to projected 
or actual changes of climate” 
1996 Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change Second 
Assessment16 
“All adjustments in behavioral or economic structure 
that reduce the vulnerability of society to changes in the 
climate system” 
1996 Smith et al. 199617 
“Improving country resilience against climate risks” 2011 Organization of Economic 
Co-Operation and 
Development18 
“A range of approaches to address loss and damage 
associated with the adverse effects of climate change, 
including impacts related to extreme weather events and 
slow onset events” 
2014 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate 
Change19 
Source: Compiled by the authors  
A term that sometimes circulates can be informally called “anti-adaptation” or 
“maladaptation.”20 21 Early definitions referred to “those actions which tend to increase 
vulnerability to climate change. It is possible to make development or investment decisions while 
neglecting the actual or potential impacts of climate change. Such decisions are termed 
maladaptive.” 22 The IPCC signaled a broader understanding of maladaptation in its 2001 report, 
which defined the term as: “Any changes in natural or human systems that inadvertently increase 
vulnerability to climate stimuli; an adaptation that does not succeed in reducing vulnerability but 
increases it instead.”23  Eisenack et al. underscore that there need not to be an unanimous 
judgment on whether a phenomena constitutes a barrier to an adaption action, and whether 
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further barriers can be reduced or overcome, which they distinguished from “limits” to 
adaption.24   
None of the established studies above, however, have investigated the LDCF in particular.  
Created in 2001, the GEF LDCF intends to help the poorest countries in the world prepare and 
implement National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs) to address the consequences of 
climate change.  Currently one of the largest funds ever created for climate adaptation, the GEF 
leveraged more than $900 million in voluntary contributions to support 213 adaptation projects in 
51 countries during the scheme’s operation from 2002 to 2015.25  These projects were implemented 
in tandem with partner agencies including the World Bank, United Nations Development Program, 
and United Nations Environment Program. 
For an in-depth analysis of the political economy effects of the LDCF, we selected a 
sample of five major efforts being implemented in Asia.  We focused on case studies from the 
Asia-Pacific region because projections suggest it will be subjected to more land degradation, 
people displaced, prosperity threatened, and economies disrupted from climatic changes 
(including sea level rises) than any other part of the planet.26 27 Already, the Asia Pacific was 
home to 85 percent of deaths and 38 percent of global economic losses due to natural disasters 
from 1980 to 2009.28  These projects, summarized in Table 2, cover a breadth of the funded 
activities within the LDCF: coastal afforestation in Bangladesh, glacial flood control in Bhutan, 
agricultural production in Cambodia, community relocation in the Maldives, and integrated 
coastal management in Vanuatu.   Under these projects, Bangladesh not only erected dykes and 
planted mangrove plantations, it incentivized agriculture and aquaculture to improve community 
income and training local officials.  Bhutan not only altered the physical shape of glacial lakes 
and rivers, built shelters, and created an early warning system, but educated public and private 
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leaders about emergency preparedness and climate risks.  Cambodia both experimented with 
crops and rehabilitating canals and ponds, and also educated provincial officials and empowered 
local villagers to decide on infrastructure investments. Maldivian planners thickened coastal 
vegetation and nourished coral reefs, and also decentralized planning and disbursed funds 
directly to local communities so that they can decide what is best for them.  Planners in Vanuatu 
hardened coastal infrastructure, solicited feedback from stakeholders and civil society, and 
enhanced the informational awareness of indigenous peoples in rural areas.   
Table 2: Overview of Five Least Developed Countries Fund Adaptation Projects 
Country Infrastructural Adaptation Organizational Adaptation Social Adaptation 
Bangladesh Mangrove plantations, mound 
plantations, dykes, and 
embankments;  early warning 
system   
Capacity building through training 
courses for local government 
officials in forestry, and 
organizational change through 
setting up new functional 
departments  
Coupling of forestry 
programs to income 
generation through 
forest products, fish, and 
food 
Bhutan Lowering glacial lake levels; 
deepening river channels; early 
warning system; climate shelters 
Workshops for government officials 
at the nodal level 
Community training in 
search and rescue, 
evacuations, and first aid 
Cambodia Climate-proofing of canals and 
communal ponds; 
experimentation with crop 
variation and diversity 
Education sessions for provincial 
and local officials 
Local empowerment 
over prioritization of 
climate-proofing 
schemes 
Maldives Sea walls; replenishment of sea 
ridges; mangrove afforestation; 
beach nourishment; coral reef 
propagation; repositioning of 
water tanks  
Decentralization of adaptation 
planning and management to local 
political units 
Community control over 
adaptation investments  
Vanuatu Roads; bridges; port 
infrastructure; sea walls 
Consultation of adaptation options 
with community stakeholder 
Dissemination of 
information kits to tribal 
leaders 
Source: Compiled by the authors  
3. Research Methods and Conceptual Approach  
 To explore the LDCF in-depth, our primary tool of data collection was semi-structured 
research interviews.  The lead author developed an interview protocol that asked respondents to 
(a) identify the most serious climate change related concerns facing communities in each 
country, (b) summarize ongoing adaptation efforts related to the LDCF fund, (c) explicate 
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expected costs and benefits for those efforts, (d) identify obstacles or barriers to implementation, 
and (e) elaborate on any broader lessons such projects offered the climate policy community.  
One advantage to the approach is it can produce rich, detailed qualitative answers to our 
questions; one disadvantage is that measures of impacts (positive or negative) are based on 
perceptions rather than more independent or objective data.  
The lead author conducted two sets of interviews, those at the start of projects (in 2010) 
followed by those done at least a year after the projects were completed (in 2015).  The intent 
was to compare the initial expectations and goals with the results and achievements (or lack 
thereof).  The first batch of interviews, 123 conducted in 2010, were done onsite in each country 
in tandem with field research and site visits, funded by a grant, and supported by a research team. 
The 2010 interviews were triangulated with a second batch of 23 interviews done solely by the 
lead author via telephone and email in January and February 2015, after each of the projects had 
terminated.  Table 3 provides an overview of the interviews disaggregated by time and project.   
At the request of some participants, the interview data is presented as anonymous with only a 
respondent number (e.g., “R23” for the 23rd interviewee).   
Table 3: Summary Data for Research Interviews (n=146)   
Case study 2010 interviews 2015 interviews Total 
Bangladesh 15 4 19 
Bhutan 20 5 25 
Cambodia 30 5 35 
Maldives 33 5 38 
Vanuatu  14 4 18 
Other (i.e., the LDCF fund or GEF in general) 11  11 
Total 123 23 146 
Source: Compiled by the authors 
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 To guide the interpretation of all of this data, the authors decided to draw from the 
conceptual approach loosely known as the “political economy” of climate change adaptation.29 30 
This approach suggests that adaptation projects must beware of four intersecting processes that 
can lower their efficacy: enclosure, exclusion, encroachment, and entrenchment.  “Enclosure” 
refers to when an adaptation project transfers a public or social asset into private hands, or 
expands the role and authority of a private actor into a formerly public sphere. It relates in part to 
how private institutions, especially corporate actors, intensify their efforts to penetrate into more 
remote or peripheral areas from which they can derive revenue. “Exclusion” often occurs in 
tandem with enclosure, and it refers to when an adaptation project excludes or displaces a 
particular group of stakeholders or limits access to resources related to due process, fairness, and 
procedural justice. The process of exclusion enables resources to be appropriated or consolidated 
by state authorities, private firms, or social elites, evident in processes such as “land-grabbing.”  
“Encroachment” refers to when adaptation projects degrade the environment, interfere with 
ecosystem services provision, intrude upon biodiversity conservation zones such as protected 
areas and national parks, or counteract climate change mitigation efforts by involving the 
emission (embodied, or direct) of greenhouse gases. Adaptation can, because it is primarily 
concerned with building human resilience, undermine the conservation of biodiversity. 
“Entrenchment” refers to when an adaptation project aggravates the disempowerment of women, 
minorities, or the vulnerable. It “entrenches” inequality by interfering with egalitarian systems of 
distribution or procedural justice, or by further concentrating wealth within a community or 
transferring risk.  Table 4 summarizes these processes, and shows how they criss-cross 
economic, political, ecological, and social dimensions.   
Table 4: Conceptual Typology of Enclosure, Exclusion, Encroachment, and Entrenchment 
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Concept Dimension Explanation 
Enclosure Economic Capturing resources or authority: transferring public assets into 
private hands, or the expansion of private roles into the public 
sector 
Exclusion Political Marginalizing stakeholders: limiting access to adaptation 
decision-making processes and fora  
Encroachment  Ecological Damaging the environment: intruding on biodiversity areas or 
other areas with predisposed land uses, or interfering with 
ecosystem services   
Entrenchment  Social Worsening inequality: aggravating the disempowerment of 
women or minorities and/or worsening concentrations of wealth  
Source: Compiled by the authors based on 31 32 
4. Results: Exposing the Political Economy of Adaptation  
This section of the paper utilizes the concepts of enclosure, exclusion, encroachment, and 
entrenchment to illustrate the implementation challenges facing our sample of 5 LDCF projects 
being implemented in the Asia-Pacific.  
4.1 Enclosing the adaptation agenda  
 Although ostensibly well-intentioned, some respondents intimated that the LDCF 
facilitated enclosure by commandeering decision-making roles that formerly belonged to 
governments. Despite China and the United States forging a partnership to combat climate 
change in September 2016, neither China nor the United States have any type of mandatory, 
nationwide climate policy, and the future of energy policy in the United States is even more 
uncertain given the recent election of Donald Trump.   Therefore, enclosure over climate change 
as an issue is understandable, perhaps even laudable.  The element of government inaction is in a 
sense a larger source of injustice since, in effect, the result is higher emissions and adaptation 
burdens.  But the LDCF response to this vacuum also inevitably creates political economy 
problems of its own.  
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 In a way, the LDCF represents a relatively new form of governance- polycentric climate 
governance- that is essentially a node of power beyond the state. The LDCF is a parallel 
bureaucracy that has appropriated, or enclosed upon, what used to be the domain of 
governments. Even with the best of intentions, and some strong justifications for intervention in 
the face of a lack of governmental action, an international regime like the LDCF requires 
organizations such as the UNFCCC and their framework of rules, expectations, prescriptions, 
and conduct to function.   
 We see this frustration in multiple comments from respondents and reports about the 
LDCF.  During the Fourteenth Conference of the Parties at Poznan, Poland, in 2008, some least 
developed countries “expressed their frustration” at this structure, at the slow pace with which 
projects were allocated funding, and at the “long and complicated” process of requesting money 
from the fund. 33    Figure 1, for example, shows the complexity of a typical LDCF project cycle 
for the United Nations Development Program, one of ten implementing agencies. The project 
cycle involves almost a dozen internal “administrators” and requires 14 to 17 months to navigate.   
It was also found that the longest lapse in time in terms of working days from the Initiation Plan 
approval to ProDoc submission was 311 days on average, 34 as this process had to involve all 
five main stakeholders as illustrated in the flowchart. This demonstrates the complexity and 
difficulties of a polycentric climate governance structure, where coordination and engagement of 
all stakeholders presented added challenges to the already complicated procedure.  This finding 
mirrors comments from our interviews, with R67 (in 2010) commenting that “the LDCF process 
is a complete headache to deal with, it makes my government even look good,” and R130 (in 
2015) stating that “the LDCF is in a way an attempt to monetize adaptation and control the 
agenda for how poor countries shape their response to climate change.”  
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Figure 1: Process flowchart for a LDCF Adaptation Project 
 
 
 
Source: Modified from United Nations Development Programme  
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 Three independent evaluations of the LDCF suggest that it results in friction and lag in 
implementing adaptation projects. The first, conducted by the UNDP in 2009, noted “justifiable 
dissatisfaction” among participants of the LDCF “concerning the lengthy time periods and 
complex procedures required to move from the NAPAs to concrete projects. In some cases, these 
procedures have led to time lapses of several years before projects get off the ground.”35 That 
review noted, for example, that projects took an average of 471 days to begin due to 
“bottlenecks” and the “many stakeholders and consultations involved.” It found that even the 
preparatory phase required “a lot of work” that ended up being “demanding” for country offices; 
the review cautioned that GEF requirements and project criteria were “complicated” and “poorly 
understood.” It lastly noted that the co-financing requirement of the LDCF meant some countries 
did not have the resources needed to get projects started. A second review, conducted by the 
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2010, concluded that “in order for the LDCF to play a 
complementary role to the emerging other climate change financing mechanisms greater 
responsiveness and flexibility of procedures will have to be introduced to ensure lack of 
duplication and complementarity.”36 And a third review, from the non-profit Climate Change 
Forum in 2010, criticized management structures at the LDCF that were “too complex,” accused 
implementing agencies such as the World Bank of adding “further bureaucracy to the process,” 
and concluded that “rules and structures make accessing funding difficult … and time-
consuming.”37  
 Within this complex bureaucratic structure, some departments and bodies have extended 
their domain over particular issue areas. For example, most negotiated vulnerability and 
adaptation action items have been addressed by the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation. It has reached agreements on a number of issues, including: How Parties should 
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fund and support developing countries’ assessment of impact, vulnerability and adaptation needs; 
how to spur capacity-building, training, education and public awareness; implementation of 
concrete adaptation activities; promotion of technology transfer to assist adaptation measures; 
and regional workshops to exchange experiences of adaption.  
 In the LDCF’s defense, managers have attempted to address many of these concerns in 
earnest with some restructuring post 2010.  As R138 noted in 2015, “We’re aware of these 
problems and have taken considerable steps to address them.”  Such awareness seems to translate 
into increased effectiveness, with one 2012 evaluation from the Australian Government noting 
that the LDCF should be praised for “successfully working with fragile states that are also least 
developed countries to develop the national adaptation programs of action” and highlighting that 
the majority of projects “have made satisfactory progress towards their development objectives.” 
It commented that human resources were well managed, that monitoring for the program was 
“strong,” and that “the Evaluation Office has made commendable efforts to improve and 
facilitate professional evaluation work in the GEF and to provide leadership, within the GEF 
partnership and internationally.”38   
In addition, during the eighteenth session of the Conference of Parties in Doha, Qatar, in 
late 2012, the GEF Secretariat noted that “there is evidence to suggest that LDCs have been able 
to learn from their initial experiences of NAPA implementation, and to scale up successful 
approaches and practices. Thanks to a streamlined project cycle, user-friendly guidelines for 
accessing resources, and enhanced communication between the GEF Secretariat and LDC 
stakeholders, proposals are being developed and processed faster.”39 As one example, the 
approval times for NAPA projects decreased from an average of 32 months to 12 months with 
some taking as little as 75 days, and elapsed time between project approval and CEO 
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endorsement for the most recent projects shrank from 17 months to 14 months.40 A review 
conducted by the Independent Evaluation Office of the Global Environment Facility in 2014 also 
indicated these NAPA implementation projects had to follow a streamlined approval process and 
have reduced the project timeline substantially.41 
 Nonetheless, the situation with enclosure does show that establishing the scope of 
international organisations is subject to constant political bargaining as well as bureaucratic and 
legal disputes between countries with unequal resources. What poorer countries tend to lose in 
negotiations is autonomy over planning and implementation processes, as well as project 
finances. When UN backed organizations such as the GEF or partners in the LDCF, such as the 
UNDP or World Bank, assume monitoring roles, they often enclose on the public sectors of poor 
countries. Thus, climate negotiations involve not only struggles between countries with different 
interests, but also clashes between and within international organisations and bureaucracies over 
the role of technology, knowledge and skills. 42 43 
4.2 Exclusionary participation and planning  
 Discussions and negotiations related to the LDCF at the global level are sometimes non-
representative, asymmetrical and exclusionary. The result is that only particular types of 
adaptation projects are implemented and the overall negotiation process tends to benefit some 
powerful parties at the exclusion of others. For instance, vulnerable developing countries are not 
equal partners in international negotiations and lack the ability to advance their own interests in 
processes such as the UNFCCC, which undergirds the LDCF.44 45 Such countries have a small 
market share of the global economy, are not members of the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (meaning they are restricted from joining the International Energy 
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Agency and other groups), and can only afford to send small delegations to key climate 
meetings.46  
 The result is that industrialized countries such as the United States and industrializing 
countries such as Brazil, China, and India are able to wield disproportionate influence and 
control the pace and scope of negotiations, including those that created the LDCF.  Even before, 
at the fourth Conference of Parties (COP) in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1998, the delegation 
from the United Sates consisted of 83 people. The average delegation from Africa, by contrast, 
had between two and four people. At the 13th meeting at Bali, the United States had a delegation 
of 224, whereas 79 countries had less than seven people to cover the vastly expanded negotiation 
agenda. Gordon argues that “African countries seemed to have no, or a weak, position and stance 
and have received few concessions.”47   As Schneider and Jane lament, “the most marginalized 
groups tend to have little political and economic power and hence have little influence in the 
decision-making process.”48  Shue even argues that disproportionate representation in 
negotiations is deplorable not only for being unfair, but also because it results in “dirty 
development” and higher rates of emissions.49  
 In fact, that climate financing should be channeled through the GEF was one of the 
contested topics of the 2005 11th COP to the UNFCCC. An early criticism from developing 
countries was that the financial assistance flowing from the GEF was biased towards problems 
and issues defined by stakeholders in the North (e.g., mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions) 
rather than those prioritized by local leaders (e.g., deforestation or improved resilience).50 51 52 
Across the entire LDCF program, R88 (in 2010) even stated that “adherence to the stipulations 
embodied within the LDCF amount to a loss of sovereignty because our government had little to 
no say in how priorities were set.”   
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 We found elements of exclusionary participation and planning further manifested at the 
national level.  Decisions during the Bangladeshi NAPA process, for instance, were made by 
economists and scientists as well as government officials, but not representatives from the most 
vulnerable groups, their professional associations, and civil society organizations.53  
Furthermore, though char water bodies are an important resource for fishers, national policies 
exclude char dwellers from land auctions, giving elites privileged access.   Yet authorities have 
frequently refused to prosecute or pursue criminal charges for the land grabbing activities 
mentioned above, dismissing claims from victims as frivolous and limiting access to legal 
recourse.54   This process further entrenched char dwellers and other marginalized groups into 
relatively powerless positions where they could not participate in the NAPA process.   
4.3 Encroaching on other land uses and biodiversity 
Each of the five LDCF projects enhanced physical and infrastructural resilience in some 
way according to more than three quarters (76%) of the interviewees.  In some situations, such as 
in Bangladesh and Bhutan, such interventions were beneficial.  The project in Bangladesh planted 
6,000 hectares of community based mangrove plantations and 500 hectares of non-mangrove 
mount plantations. As one of our interviewee respondents (R23) put it in 2010, “this part of the 
project created a ‘green shield’ around vulnerable communities.”  In Bhutan, planners improved 
early warning systems and drained glacial lakes.  The government replaced a manual warning 
system of human monitoring and the sounding of gongs with an automatic one composed of gauges 
monitoring glacial lake bathymetry (depth) as well as sensors along rivers connected to automated 
sirens.  As R123 commented in 2015, “now we will know within seconds if a glacial lake outburst 
flood occurs, rather than before when it could take minutes or even hours to properly warn people.” 
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 However, even these interventions came with trade-offs to other types of resilience, often 
natural or ecological resilience. The Bangladeshi project also erected about 220 kilometers of 
concrete dykes and more than 1,000 kilometers of earthen embankments.  R130 (in 2015) noted 
that “the associated greenhouse gas emissions with all of those dykes and embankments is 
significant, and moreover some floods have already breached their protections, requiring energy 
intensive pumping of water out of the flooded dyke.”  R138 (in 2015) similarly noted that in 
Bhutan “the glacial protection efforts being implemented have also contributed to deforestation 
and the increased sedimentation of rivers.”  Part of Cambodia’s LDFC strategy involved what 
R140 (in 2015) called “modifying crop patterns, which has seen poorer farmers leave the sector 
because they cannot afford the more expensive inputs.”    Both the Maldives and Vanuatu have 
focused in part on building sea walls, but such barriers can, in the words of R23 (in 2010), choke 
the vitality and strength of coral reefs.” 
 An eminently frustrating component of such encroachment is that it is likely not enough 
to eliminate climate risks as intended by planners. Put another way, given the level of risk, such 
interventions are, to a degree, futile.  The starting point of the LDCF is the formulation and 
implementation of country specific NAPAs, which represent a critical first step in implementing 
adaptation projects.  These NAPAs, while useful tools, are essentially only guideposts for how to 
prioritize adaptation investments; they do not directly provide the financing for those plans. As 
R12 stated in 2010, “the success of the NAPA process will largely be determined by how well it 
paves the way for scaled up investments in climate-resilient development in accordance with 
integrated, long term plans.” In other words, the presence of such plans is no guarantee that their 
recommended measures will be implemented.   
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Even when countries adhere strongly to the priorities formulated in their own NAPAs, 
there is no guarantee that they sufficiently increased resilience or reduced climate-related risks.  
For instance, if sea levels rise under more extreme scenarios, practically no amount of adaptation 
or investment in resilience will suffice for countries such as Bangladesh, the Maldives, or 
Vanuatu.  As R30 explained in 2010:  
The challenge Bangladesh now faces is to cope with changes in climate already happening 
every year. We are strengthening coastal embankments, yes, but the intensity of erosion 
and frequency of storms are also increasing and I feel like we are often in a race against 
time where time is running out.  We have developed saline-tolerant rice varieties but the 
concentration of salinity is going up. We can’t keep on producing crops when land is 
flooded and water salty; it’s practically not possible at the moment. Adaptation has its 
limits.  
If the situation worsens, or if adaptation investments are not able to keep pace with vulnerabilities 
and risks, low-lying countries, and especially small island developing states, may have to switch 
entirely to what R30 called “retreat” measures such as forcibly relocating communities to higher 
ground and possibility create a new generation of climate refugees.  Similarly, in the Maldives and 
Vanuatu, a sea level rise of one meter would put the country, as R40 explained in 2010, 
“completely under water.”  In the Maldives, most islands are less than 1 meter high, meaning even 
small rises in sea level could subject the country to “regular tidal inundations.”55  In Vanuatu, R140 
remarked in 2015 that “under the more severe projections of sea level rise, we may not be able to 
save the country no matter what we do.” This demonstrates the importance that adaptation must 
go hand-in-hand with mitigation strategies, but more importantly, the need to assess the resilience 
of natural ecosystems in light of adaptation strategies.  
Insights from the LDCF 19 
 
4.4 Entrenching inequality  
A final political economy dimension is entrenchment, the aggravation of 
disempowerment or increased income inequality across communities, which is exacerbated by 
exclusionary participation as alluded to earlier.  Because the LDCF operates at the global level, 
most of its entrenchment is grand in nature and international in scope; it relates to a discernable 
lack of fair (and promised) funding for adaptation as well as limited technology transfer, which 
keeps the South locked—entrenched—in technological inferiority and macroeconomic 
inequality. 
 One dimension of entrenchment is financial: funds are not relegated to LDCF adaptation 
projects despite commitments to the contrary. The LDCF is clearly insufficient to ensure the 
implementation of all needed adaptation projects. As noted earlier, so far the fund has leveraged 
slightly more than $900 million.   This creates what R78 called “huge gap” between funding 
amounts and needs, with an estimated $10 to $100 billion in annual funding needed to prepare all 
developing countries for climate change.  Similarly, an assessment from the Potsdam Institute for 
Climate Impact Research, European Environment Agency, and other institutions calculated that 
at least $70 to $100 billion of investment will be needed per year for every year from 2010 to 
2050 if adaptation needs are to be met.56  As one recent independent evaluation put it, “the 
output of these funds falls far short of the estimated needs.”57  Another concluded that even if all 
pledges were realized, “it is not clear that it will generate sufficient funds to address the 
adaptation needs of developing countries.”58 
 In the absence of ambitious emission reduction accomplishments, the need for adaptation 
finance will increase. However, private financing is unlikely to cover a substantial proportion of 
this need.59 In another overview of this finance landscape, Buchner et al. estimated annual global 
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climate finance flows at roughly $343 to $385 billion.60 Public funding amounted to $16 to 23 
billion whereas private institutions raised $217 to $243 billion in both developed countries ($193 
billion) and developing countries ($172 billion). This all looks promising until one realizes that 
the vast bulk of the finance ($330.7 to $369.3 billion) targeted mitigation activities. Only a small 
proportion targeted adaptation. 
 Even when money is awarded, it usually comes with hidden strings attached.  As one 
example, because the LDCF is supposed to prioritize what R55 called “equitable access” for all 
participating countries, individual projects have a “ceiling” on the amount they support.  For 
instance, from 2001 to 2006 the cap on LDCF projects was $3.5 million, in 2008 it was raised to 
$6 million, in 2010 it was increased to $8 million, and today it is $20 million (though most recent 
projects average between $6 and $7 million).  Although the LDCF has a mandate to finance the 
full additional cost of adaptation, without a requirement for matching co-financing, in practice 
the ceiling inadvertently requires hosting governments to co-sponsor projects, or find other 
institutions to match contributions—contributing to the unsustainability of long-term projects.  
Moreover, because the LDCF is voluntary, it is only replenished when donor countries decide to 
be generous, making it difficult to accurately predict the amount of resources available to 
countries over long timeframes.61 
 This finding—that the absence of funding and consequent technology transfer patterns 
can at times enhance vulnerability among particular classes or communities—is partially 
supported by four studies.  For instance one study examining only adaptation efforts being 
undertaken in small island developing states noted that “international adaptation funding 
modalities did little to address root causes of vulnerability or support system transformations.”62  
One study looking at NAPAs being implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa noted a “decline in 
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gender sensitivity throughout the intervention cycle” and that many projects unintentionally 
marginalize women.63 Similarly, another assessment of the NAPA process in Burkina Faso noted 
that “participatory processes were not effectively integrated at the local level.”64  Yet another 
study reviewed 41 NAPAs being implemented worldwide and argued that they did not address 
underlying causes behind climate change such as human population growth or poor family 
planning.65  In sum, these studies, when combined with our own primary data, imply that LDCF 
projects may promote some particular types of resilience in isolated ways but generally fail to 
promote mainstreamed, comprehensive, social transformation.   
5. Discussion: Rethinking the Governance of Adaptation  
How can we make sense of the politics and institutions that mediate the relationship 
between poverty exacerbated by climate change and the governance of global funds for climate 
adaptation through the LDCF?   
To understand the effects of adaptation efforts firstly requires an understanding of the 
way global governance institutions govern in practice; increasingly through polycentric 
formations which fuse the agency and funds of public and actors, as described by the literature 
on transnational climate change governance.66 Global institutions such as the GEF do not occupy 
a politically neutral space of course and are a riven with the sorts of power relations that run 
through all areas of global politics. Indeed, the GEF has been subject of critical analysis of its 
neoliberal credentials67 and the ways in which its programmes and interventions advance a 
particular types of ‘green neoliberalism’ or ‘green governmentality’.68  
Explanations which combine elements of ‘governance from above’ (by global institutions 
such as the GEF) and ‘governance from below’ (at national and sub-national level)69 through a 
political economy lens help to understand the outcomes we observe as a product of political 
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negotiations between actors within different degrees of power and policy autonomy. These effect 
decisions about which countries, sectors and projects are worthy of support that reflect the 
interests and preferences of global funders and national and local policy-makers. Those public 
actors in turn are shaped by lobbying from private and civil society actors with a stake in the 
direction of adaptation finance, and decision-making inevitably a product of particular 
governance systems and policy processes.70 Such perspectives usefully show how flows of 
finance from the same donor can have such uneven and inconsistent impacts across different 
contexts once refracted through local political economies where different social relations, 
governance systems and rent-seeking practices often conspire to distort the original aims and 
intentions of the intervention. 
Furthermore, what is also significant for us here, is engaging with work which helps to 
account for the uneven and socially differentiated impact and effectiveness of adaptation finance 
that we observe here. In order to explain the variation in outcomes, an emphasis on the political 
ecology of adaptation is helpful.71 This situates the effectiveness of adaptation in relation to its 
ability to engage with, navigate and transform local political ecologies in the sites where it 
operates. At its broadest, political ecology seeks to provide a framework for understanding 
human-society or ‘socio-natural’ relations.72 73 ‘Classic’ political ecology concerns include 
issues of access to material and natural resources, and questions of equity and justice issues in 
the negotiation and distribution of social and environmental benefits at multiple scales.74 A 
necessary step, is to explore how local and global power dynamics produce environmental 
outcomes, along the lines of a ‘global political ecology’ approach.75 76 This links the challenges 
facing the LDCF that we describe in section 5 around funding and management structures 
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(‘governance from above’) with the documented effects of LDCF finance mediated as they are 
by local institutions and political ecologies.  
Methodologically this requires tracking and tracing the institutions, actors and networks 
that connect ‘global’ governance of finance to particular ‘local’ outcomes; the approach we 
adopt here. A political ecology focus enables an understanding of a) the ‘local’ social and 
environmental consequences of global (environmental) governance and the interests that it 
embodies and projects, and b) the ways in which ‘regimes’ that govern resources at different 
levels engage with and are transformed by global adaptation finance. It is through exploring the 
nature of the relationship between macro and site specific dynamics that we argue interesting 
theoretical and practical insights might be derived. 
Tellingly, these kinds of political dynamics have been highlighted in analyses of other 
key climate finance mechanisms where global inequities in flows of finance are then exacerbated 
by exclusion of groups affected by projects at national level. For example, under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) China captured 60% of accumulated investment, India 11% 
and Africa as a whole (including South Africa and the countries of North Africa) received only 
3% of accumulated investment. 77 78  Those same governments have been largely unresponsive to 
claims of displacement, exclusion and land-grabbing associated with CDM projects by 
marginalized citizens of their own countries.79 80 This further emphasizes the need to attend to 
the political and economic impact of supposedly neutral climate finance mechanisms, like the 
CDM and LDCF. 
 Moreover, within the landscape of climate finance as a whole (funding mitigation as well 
as adaptation activities), the bulk of funds have (oddly) gone to industrialized rather than 
developing countries. The thinking is that poor countries are more likely to accept technology 
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transfer if devices or processes are available cheaply or accessible through the public domain. 
Middle-income countries have engineering firms and programs for Research, Development and 
Demonstration, and are therefore seen as the best conduit for adaptation funding. 81  In the 
example of the CDM, China has been seen to pursue a strategic, nationally coordinated process 
of leveraging climate finance to support indigenous technological capacity building82 in ways 
that LDCs are unlikely to have the technological or political/administrative capacities to pursue 
(unless, of course, climate finance mechanisms were specifically used to build such capacities83).  
 Such financing patterns can sometimes exacerbate the dynamics of entrenchment 
discussed in section 4 above.  Developed countries can hoard their innovations and limit 
investments in capacity training in developing countries, on the pretext that these developing 
countries lack the training or institutional capacity to appropriate such technologies. Thus, 
unequal positions in the world economy “entail… selective transfers of technology and know-
how while making sure that the impetus for the direction of technological change” remains with 
developed countries.84 These issues definitively hamper the rate of technological development.85   
Third, technology transfer policies often encourage the governments of indebted countries to 
create more favorable conditions for foreign investors and transnational corporations. Research 
on the unequal exchange of foreign investment dependence and the environment have revealed 
that increased levels of foreign investment in less-developed countries do not necessarily lead to 
the spread of cleaner technologies and production processes, but instead risk being an instrument 
for polluting or resource depleting extraction, ultimately threating human development.86 Thus, 
the selectivity of technology transfer cements a pattern of unequal exchange between rich and 
poor countries. 
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 Rereading global efforts to finance climate change adaptation (and mitigation) projects as 
part of a system of exploitation and entrenchment demands that we rethink how these projects 
are designed, implemented, and evaluated.  In this vein, concerns of social justice and politics 
have been a central focus of recent innovation studies inspired engagements with the issue of 
technology transfer under international climate policy87. Whilst the empirical focus of this 
literature has tended towards low carbon energy technologies more than adaptation technologies, 
the emphasis on understanding processes of technological change (e.g. towards more climate 
resilient socio-technical systems), via an understanding of the incremental88, capability building89 
and systemic90 nature of innovation and development, implies a need for a fundamental shift in 
how finance occurs.  The international community must move away from simple “technology 
finance” mechanisms (like the LDCF and CDM), towards progressive approaches designed to 
build context-specific technological capabilities around climate technologies91, particularly in 
LDCs where such capabilities are most lacking. More recent interventions, drawing in part from 
the socio-technical transitions92 and sociology93 literatures, have also stressed the need for 
investments to be better attenuated to the social practices of poor and marginalized people, 
whom it is ultimately assumed such mechanisms will benefit. Without such targeted investment 
in capability building it is likely that climate technology finance mechanisms will continue to 
reinforce the competitive advantages of rapidly emerging economies and international 
technology suppliers.94 Either way, as the analysis here attests, an urgent need exists to revisit 
such critiques with careful attention to political economy considerations, from the global to the 
local, in order to articulate possible, more equitable, ways forward. 
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6 Conclusion: Lessons and Policy Implications   
To conclude, the LDCF brings to light four salient conclusions related to climate policy 
and adaptation practice, although generalizability beyond the projects examined must be 
undertaken with care.   
Our first conclusion is the most direct and simple: the political economy of adaptation, 
namely the processes of enclosure, exclusion, encroachment, and entrenchment, can distort the 
goals and effects of adaptation projects.  No matter how noble the intentions of planners, or how 
well interventions are designed, adaptation projects within the LDCF have their own underlying 
political economy and ecology. Adaptation projects can become a flashpoint for competing 
interests, generating their own sets of winners and losers—even when they might produce a net 
social gain. Many of these conflicts involve those seeking to enclose agendas or exclude 
stakeholders from access. In some situations, adaptation projects encroach upon and subvert the 
intended goals of wildlife conservation, or entrench disparities in wealth and development. 
Therefore, adaptation should be reconceived as political, a deliberative challenge involving the 
satisfaction of competing preferences; a social dilemma pitting, at times, the climatic and 
development goals of improved resilience against the pressing needs of marginalized and 
vulnerable populations; and a moral quandary revolving around how adaptation burdens and 
benefits are fairly, or unfairly, distributed.  
Secondly, researchers and practitioners need to reconceive the concept of adaptation as 
more than a local phenomenon. For instance, a slew of academic research has long suggested 
that mitigation (stopping emissions) is global in scope whereas adaptation (coping with 
consequences) is local in scope.95 96 Mitigation is prone to a barrage of common pool resource 
problems, essentially forcing politicians to sacrifice the present for future gain (which has proven 
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extremely difficult if it does not hold clear promises on return of investments, such as major 
infrastructure improvements, or strengthened power positions or sense of security). Conversely, 
the mantra goes that adaptation projects result in almost immediate local benefits.  The LDCF 
shows, instead, that adaptation interventions can reinforce broader development goals and 
agendas, strengthen the hegemony of states and markets, create their own type of bureaucracy, or 
affirm the sovereignty of state institutions. Adaptation’s costs and benefits are not necessarily 
limited to the areas where adaptation projects are being implemented. They become intertwined 
with multi-scalar issues of unequal power relations between different stakeholder groups, 
poverty, inequality, and justice. 
Third, and critically, is that programs like the LDCF should not be abandoned.  Our first 
two conclusions—that political economy can reduce the effectiveness of adaptation, and that 
adaptation can be influenced by broad global currents alongside more particular local events—
might lead some readers to misinterpret our stance on adaptation. We do not believe these 
findings mean that all adaptation projects should be cancelled, or programs like the LDCF 
abandoned. We set out to show how the political economy processes of adaptation work, and 
how they can at times distort or mold adaptation projects and processes to the interests of 
dominant stakeholders, not that they completely undermine or obfuscate all of the benefits of 
adaptation. Even the specific critiques we raise, some of them quite sobering, are aimed at a 
target: improving and learning from adaptation’s political economy so that the most vulnerable 
are helped, and so that benefits and burdens are made visible, and distributed fairly and 
according to representative processes.   We argue that planners and practitioners of adaptation 
projects need to become more cognizant of the potential for projects to harm others, or admit 
complicity in the processes of enclosure, exclusion, encroachment, and entrenchment.   
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As we emphasized in the elaboration of exclusion and entrenchment above, there are 
clear parallels between the political economy dynamics we observe in relation to the LDCF and 
those observed in other climate finance mechanisms, like the CDM.  If our interest is in 
strengthening processes of either climate adaptation or mitigation, it is time to take seriously the 
need for creating and/or strengthening institutions within LDCs, supporting targeted capacity 
building around knowledge of local contexts through which international climate finance 
mechanisms might be mediated. This arguably stands a better chance strengthening long term 
capacity building that is cognizant of the socio-cultural and political practices that characterize 
any given context. It is unlikely to get us away from the global political economy dynamics we 
highlight in our analysis above; but it does imply a more devolved and locally owned system of 
governance were local contexts and local capacity building perhaps stands more chance of 
exerting agency over the ways in which future climate finance is spent.97 Either way, such 
focused spending on institutional and technological capacity building in LDCs would represent 
at least a partial departure from the kinds of elite capture of the benefits of climate finance we 
articulate here and elsewhere. 
Ultimately, some climate change adaptation interventions can make the present system 
resistant to change, others more capable of adapting to change.98  A key challenge for future 
adaptation efforts will be promoting different types of resilience—infrastructural, institutional, 
community—especially for the most vulnerable, that do not trade-off with each other, and 
catalyzing lasting adaptive transformations that only serve to encourage, rather than restrict, 
positive social and equitable change. 
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